Nonzero-Sum Risk Sensitive Stochastic Games for Continuous Time Markov
  Chains by Ghosh, Mrinal K. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
02
45
4v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  8
 M
ar 
20
16
NONZERO-SUM RISK SENSITIVE STOCHASTIC GAMES
FOR CONTINUOUS TIME MARKOV CHAINS
MRINAL K. GHOSH, K. SURESH KUMAR AND CHANDAN PAL
Abstract. We study nonzero-sum stochastic games for continuous time
Markov chains on a denumerable state space with risk sensitive dis-
counted and ergodic cost criteria. For the discounted cost criterion we
first show that the corresponding system of coupled HJB equations has
an appropriate solution. Then under an additional additive structure
on the transition rate matrix and payoff functions, we establish the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. For the ergodic cost
criterion we assume a Lyapunov type stability assumption and a small
cost condition. Under these assumptions we show that the correspond-
ing system of coupled HJB equations admits a solution which leads to
the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Key words: Risk sensitive stochastic games, Continuous time Markov chains,
Coupled HJB equations, Nash equilibrium, Stationary strategy, Eventually
stationary strategy.
1. Introduction
We study nonzero-sum stochastic games on infinite time horizon for con-
tinuous time Markov chains on a denumerable state space. The performance
evaluation criterion is exponential of integral cost which addresses the deci-
sion makers (i.e., players) attitude towards risk. In other words we address
the problem of nonzero-sum risk sensitive stochastic games involving con-
tinuous time Markov chains. In the literature of stochastic games involving
continuous time Markov chains, one usually studies the integral of the cost
(see, e.g., Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma [16], [17], [18]) which is the so called
risk-neutral situation. In the exponential of integral cost, the evaluation
criterion is multiplicative as opposed to the additive nature of evaluation
criterion in the integral of cost case. This difference makes the risk sensitive
case significantly different from its risk neutral counterpart. The study of
risk sensitive criterion was first introduced by Bellman in [2]; see Whittle [30]
and the references therein. Though this criterion is studied extensively in the
context of stochastic dynamic optimization both in discrete and continuous
time (see, e.g., Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [5], Di Masi and
Stettner [6], [7], [8], Fleming and Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez [11], [12], Fleming
1
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and McEneaney [13], Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Marcus [19], [20], Howard
and Matheson [22], Jacobson [23], Rothblum [28]), the corresponding re-
sults for stochastic dynamic games are rather sparse. Notable exceptions
are Basar [1], El-Karoui and Hamadene [9], James et al. [24], Klompstra
[25]. Recently risk sensitive continuous time Markov decision processes has
been studied by Ghosh and Saha [14], Kumar and Pal [26], [27]. In this
paper we extend the results of the above three papers to the nonzero-sum
stochastic games. In particular we establish the existence of a Nash equi-
libria for risk-sensitive discounted and long-run average (or ergodic) cost
criteria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the
problem description and preliminaries. The discounted cost criterion is an-
alyzed in Section 3. Here we first establish the existence of a solution to the
corresponding coupled Hamilton-Jacobi- Bellman (HJB) equations. Then
under certain additive structure on the transition rate (infinite) matrix and
payoff functions, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov
strategies. In Section 4, we turn our attention to the ergodic cost criterion.
Under a Lyapunov type stability assumption and a small cost assumption,
we carry out the vanishing discount asymptotics. This leads to the exis-
tence of appropriate solutions to the coupled HJB equations for the ergodic
cost criterion. This in turn leads to the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in stationary strategies. We conclude our paper in Section 5 with a few
remarks.
2. Problem Description and Preliminaries
For the sake of notational simplicity we treat two player game. The N -
player game for N ≥ 3 is analogous. Let Ui, i = 1, 2, be compact metric
spaces and Vi = P(Ui), the space of probability measures on Ui with Pro-
horov topology. Let
U := U1 × U2 and V := V1 × V2.
Let π¯ij : U → [0,∞) for i 6= j and π¯ii : U → R for i ∈ S. Define πij : V → R
as follows: for v := (v1, v2) ∈ V ,
πij(v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
π¯ij(u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2) :=
∫
U
π¯ij(u)v(du),
where u := (u1, u2) ∈ U , i, j ∈ S := {1, 2, · · · }. Throughout this paper we
assume that:
(A1) The transition rates π¯ij(u) ≥ 0 for all i 6= j, u ∈ U and the transition
rates π¯ij(u) are conservative, i.e.,
∑
j∈S
π¯ij(u) = 0 for i ∈ S and u ∈ U .
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The functions π¯ij are continuous and
sup
i∈S,u∈U
[−π¯ii(u)] :=M <∞ .
We consider a continuous time controlled Markov chain Y (t) with state space
S and controlled rate matrix Πv1,v2 = (πij(v1, v2)), given by the stochastic
integral
(2.1) dY (t) =
∫
R
h(Y (t−), v1(t), v2(t), z)℘(dzdt).
Here ℘(dzdt) is a Poisson random measure with intensity dzdt, where dzdt
denotes the Lebesgue measure on R × [0,∞). The control process v(·) :=
(v1(·), v2(·)) takes value in V , and h : S × V × R→ R is defined as follows:
(2.2) h(i, v, z) =
{
j − i if z ∈ ∆ij(v)
0 otherwise,
where v := (v1, v2) and {∆ij(v) : i 6= j, i, j ∈ S} denotes intervals of the
form [a, b) with length of ∆ij(v) = πij(v) which are pairwise disjoint for
each fixed v ∈ V .
If vi(t) = v¯i(t, Y (t−)) for some measurable map v¯i : [0,∞)×S → Vi, then vi
is called a Markov strategy for the ith player. With an abuse of terminology,
the map v¯i itself is called a Markov strategy of player i. A Markov strategy vi
is called a stationary strategy if the map v¯i does not have explicit dependence
on time. We denote the set of all Markov strategies by Mi and the set of
all stationary strategies by Si for the ith player. The spaces S1 and S2 are
endowed with the product topology. Since V1 and V2 are compact, it follows
that S1 and S2 are compact as well.
The existence of a unique weak solution to the equation (2.1) for a pair
of Markov strategies (v1, v2) for a given initial distribution µ ∈ P(S) follows
using the assumption (A1), see Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma [[15], Theorem
2.3, Theorem 2.5, pp.14-15].
We now list the commonly used notations below.
• Cb([a, b]× S) denotes the set of all functions f : [a, b]× S → R such
that f(·, i) ∈ Cb[a, b], for each i ∈ S.
• C1((a, b)×S) denotes the set of all functions f : (a, b)×S → R such
that f(·, i) ∈ C1(a, b), for each i ∈ S.
• C∞c (a, b) denotes the set of all infinitely differentiable functions on
(a, b) with compact support.
• For any f : S → R, (v1, v2) ∈ V1×V2, Πv1,v2f(i) =
∑
j∈S
πij(v1, v2)f(j).
Set
BW (S) = {h : S → R| sup
i∈S
|h(i)|
W (i)
<∞},
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where W is the Lyapunov function as in (A3) (to be described in Section
4). Define for h ∈ BW (S),
‖h‖W = sup
i∈S
|h(i)|
W (i)
.
Then BW (S) is a Banach space with the norm ‖ · ‖W .
For k = 1, 2, let r¯k : S × U1 × U2 → [0, ∞) be the running cost function
for the kth player, i.e., when state of the system is i and the actions (u1, u2)
are chosen by the players, then the kth player incurs a cost at the rate of
r¯k(i, u1, u2). Throughout this paper, we assume that the functions r¯k are
bounded and continuous. Each player wants to minimize his accumulated
cost over his strategies. The time horizon is infinite and we consider two
risk sensitive cost evaluation criteria, viz., discounted cost and ergodic cost
criteria which we describe now.
2.1. Discounted cost criterion. Let θk ∈ (0, Θ), for a fixed Θ > 0, be
the risk aversion parameter chosen by the kth player, k = 1, 2. For a pair of
Markov strategies (v1, v2), the α-discounted payoff criterion, for kth player
is given by
(2.3)
J v1,v2α,k (θk, i) :=
1
θk
ln Ev1,v2i
[
eθk
∫∞
0
e−αtrk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−))dt
]
, i ∈ S,
where α > 0 is the discount parameter, Y (t) is the Markov chain corre-
sponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2 and E
v1,v2
i denotes the expectation with
respect to the law of the process Y (t) with initial condition Y (0) = i, and
rk : S × V1 × V2 → [0, ∞) is given by
rk(i, v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
r¯k(i, u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2).
Definition 2.1. For (θ1, θ2) ∈ (0, Θ)×(0, Θ), a pair of strategies (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) ∈
M1 ×M2 is said to be a Nash equilibrium if
J
v∗
1
,v∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i) ≤ J
v1,v
∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i), for all v1 ∈ M1 and i ∈ S
J
v∗
1
,v∗
2
α,2 (θ2, i) ≤ J
v∗
1
,v2
α,2 (θ2, i), for all v2 ∈ M2 and i ∈ S.
2.2. Ergodic Cost Criterion. For a pair of Markov strategies (v1, v2), the
risk-sensitive ergodic cost for player k is given by
(2.4)
ρv1,v2k (θk, i) := lim sup
T→∞
1
θkT
lnEv1,v2i
[
eθk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
.
Definition 2.2. For (θ1, θ2) ∈ (0, Θ)×(0, Θ), a pair of strategies (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) ∈
M1 ×M2 is called a Nash equilibrium if
ρ
v∗
1
,v∗
2
1 (θ1, i) ≤ ρ
v1,v
∗
2
1 (θ1, i) for all v1 ∈M1 and i ∈ S
and
ρ
v∗
1
,v∗
2
2 (θ2, i) ≤ ρ
v∗
1
,v2
2 (θ2, i) for all v2 ∈ M2 and i ∈ S.
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We wish to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strate-
gies.
We now outline a procedure for establishing the existence of a Nash equi-
librium. We treat the ergodic cost case for this purpose. The discounted
cost case can be analyzed along similar lines. Suppose player 2 announces
that he is going to employ a strategy v2 ∈ S2. In such a scenario, player 1
attempts to minimize
ρv1,v21 (θ1, i) = lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnEv1,v2i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
,
over v1 ∈ M1. Thus for player 1 it is a continuous time Markov decision
problem (CTMDP) with risk sensitive ergodic cost. This problem has been
studied by Ghosh and Saha [14], Kumar and Pal [26], [27]. In particular
under certain assumptions, it is shown by Kumar and Pal [26], [27] that the
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation

θ1ρ1 ψˆ1(i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2(i)ψˆ1(i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v2(i))ψˆ1(i)
]
ψˆ1(i0) = 1,
has a suitable solution (ρ1, ψˆ1), where ρ1 is a scalar and ψˆ1 : S → R has
suitable growth rate; i0 is a fixed element of S. Furthermore it is shown by
Kumar and Pal [26], [27] that
ρ1 = inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnEv1,v2i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
,
and if v∗1 ∈ S1 is such that for i ∈ S
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2(i)ψˆ1(i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v2(i))ψˆ1(i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v2(i)ψˆ1(i) + θ1r1(i, v
∗
1(i), v2(i))ψˆ1(i),
then v∗1 ∈ S1 is an optimal control for player 1, i.e., for any i ∈ S
ρ1 = lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnE
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (t−),v∗1 (Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
.
In other words given that player 2 is using the strategy v2 ∈ S2, v
∗
1 ∈ S1 is
an optimal response for player 1. Clearly v∗1 depends on v2 and moreover
there may be several optimal responses for player 1 in S1. Analogous results
holds for player 2 if player 1 announces that he is going to use a strategy
v1 ∈ S1. Hence given a pair of strategies (v1, v2) ∈ S1×S2, we can find a set
of pairs of optimal responses {(v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1 × S2} via the appropriate pair
of HJB equations described above. This defines a set-valued map. Clearly
any fixed point of this set-valued map is a Nash equilibrium.
The above discussion leads to the following procedure for finding a pair
of Nash equilibrium strategies for ergodic cost criterion. Suppose that there
exist a pair of stationary strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1 × S2, a pair of scalars
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(ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2) and a pair of functions (ψˆ
∗
1 , ψˆ
∗
2) with appropriate growth conditions,
such that the coupled HJB equations given by


θ1ρ
∗
1 ψˆ
∗
1(i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2(i)ψˆ
∗
1(i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
1(i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v∗
2
(i)ψˆ
∗
1(i) + θ1r1(i, v
∗
1(i), v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
1(i)
ψˆ∗1(i0) = 1,
θ2ρ
∗
2 ψˆ
∗
2(i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1
(i),v2ψˆ
∗
2(i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v2)ψˆ
∗
2(i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v∗
2
(i)ψˆ
∗
2(i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
2(i)
ψˆ∗2(i0) = 1,
where as before i0 ∈ S is a fixed point, then it can be shown that (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2)
is a pair of Nash equilibrium and (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2) is the pair of corresponding Nash
values. An analogous coupled system of HJB equation for the discounted
cost criterion can be derived along similar lines. We first solve the coupled
HJB equations for the discounted cost criterion (to be describe in the next
section). We then carry out the vanishing discount asymptotics to obtain
an appropriate solution of the above coupled HJB equation for the ergodic
cost criterion.
3. Analysis of Discounted Cost Criterion
We carry out our analysis of the discounted cost criterion via the criterion
(3.1) Jv1,v2α,k (θk, i) := E
v1,v2
i
[
eθk
∫∞
0
e−αtrk(X(t),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−))dt
]
.
Since logarithmic is an increasing function, therefore any Nash equilibrium
for the criterion (2.3) is Nash equilibrium for above criterion. To establish
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the discounted cost criterion, we first
study the corresponding coupled HJB equations.
3.1. Coupled HJB Equations for the Discounted Case. Let v2 ∈ S2
be an arbitrarily fixed strategy of the second player. Consider the CTMDP
for player 1 with the α-discounted (α > 0) risk-sensitive cost criterion
(3.2) Jv2α,1(θ1, i, v1) = E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ1
∫∞
0
e−αt r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
,
where Y (t) is the process (2.1) corresponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 × S2 with
initial condition i ∈ S.
We define the value function for the cost criterion (3.2) by
ψv2α,1(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈M1
Jv2α,1(θ1, i, v1).
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Then by the result of Ghosh and Saha [14], Kumar and Pal [26], ψv2α,1 is the
unique solution in Cb([0,Θ] × S) ∩ C
1((0,Θ) × S) to
(3.3)

αθ1
dψv2α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2(i)ψ
v2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v2(i))ψ
v2
α,1(θ1, i)
]
ψv2α,1(0, i) = 1.
Similarly let player 1 fix a strategy v1 ∈ S1 and consider the CTMDP for
player 2 with α-discounted risk-sensitive cost criterion
Jv1α,2(θ2, i, v2) = E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ2
∫∞
0
e−αt r2(Y (t−),v1(Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
.
Set
ψv1α,2(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈M2
Jv1α,2(θ2, i, v2).
Then, as before, ψv1α,2 is the unique solution in Cb([0,Θ]×S)∩C
1((0,Θ)×S)
to
(3.4)

αθ2
dψv1α,2
dθ2
(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv1(i),v2ψ
v1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, v1(i), v2)ψ
v1
α,2(θ2, i)
]
ψv1α,2(0, i) = 1.
To proceed further we establish some technical results needed later.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1). Then for each θk ∈ (0,Θ), k = 1, 2, and α > 0,
i ∈ S
1 ≤ ψv1α,2(θ2, i) ≤ e
θ2‖r2‖∞
α , and 1 ≤ ψv2α,1(θ1, i) ≤ e
θ1‖r1‖∞
α .
Also
‖
dψv1α,2
dθ2
‖∞ ≤
‖r2‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r2‖∞
α , and ‖
dψv2α,1
dθ1
‖∞ ≤
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α ,
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the sup-norm.
Proof. Since
ψv2α,1(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈M1
Ev1,v2i
[
eθ1
∫∞
0
e−αt r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
,
it follows that
1 ≤ ψv2α,1(θ1, i) ≤ e
θ1‖r1‖∞
α , ∀ 0 < θ1 < Θ, i ∈ S, 0 < α < 1.
Similarly for ψv1α,2 we obtain
1 ≤ ψv1α,2(θ2, i) ≤ e
θ2‖r2‖∞
α , ∀ 0 < θ2 < Θ, i ∈ S, 0 < α < 1.
For (v1, v2) ∈ M1 × S2, i ∈ S, set
F 1α(i, v1, v2) =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt r1(Y (t−), v1(t, Y (t−)), v2(Y (t−)))dt
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and
G1α(θ1, i, v1, v2) = E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ1
∫∞
0
e−αt r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(Y (t−)))dt
]
.
It is easily seen that
dG1α
dθ1
= Ev1,v2i [F
1
αe
θ1F
1
α ] ≤
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α .
For each ǫ > 0,
G1α(θ1 + ǫ, i, v1, v2)−G
1
α(θ1, i, v1, v2) = ǫ
dG1α
dθ1
(θǫ, i, v1, v2),
for some θǫ which lies on the line segment joining θ1 and θ1 + ǫ. Therefore
|G1α(θ1 + ǫ, i, v1, v2)−G
1
α(θ1, i, v1, v2)| ≤ ǫ
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α .
Thus
|ψv2α,1(θ1 + ǫ, i)− ψ
v2
α,1(θ1, i)| ≤ sup
v1∈M1
|G1α(θ1 + ǫ, i, v1, v2)−G
1
α(θ1, i, v1, v2)|
≤ ǫ
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α .
Analogous bound can be proved if ǫ < 0. Hence it follows that∥∥∥dψ
v2
α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i)
∥∥∥
∞
≤
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α .
Using analogous arguments we can show that∥∥∥dψ
v1
α,2
dθ2
(θ2, i)
∥∥∥
∞
≤
‖r2‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r2‖∞
α .
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.2. Assume (A1). Let v1 ∈ S1, v2 ∈ S2. Then the maps v2 → ψ
v2
α,1
and v1 → ψ
v1
α,2 are continuous.
Proof. Let vm2 → vˆ2 in S2, i.e., v
m
2 (i) → vˆ2(i) in V2 for each i ∈ S. By
Lemma 3.1, we have
1 ≤ ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i) ≤ e
θ1‖r1‖∞
α and
ψ
vm
2
α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) ≤
‖r1‖∞
α
e
Θ‖r1‖∞
α .
Thus by Arzela-Ascoli theorem there exists a function ψα,1 in Cb((0,Θ]×S)
and a subsequence denoted by ψ
vm
2
α,1 by an abuse of notation, such that {ψ
vm
2
α,1}
converges uniformly to ψα,1 over compact subset of (0,Θ) × S. Let ϕ ∈
C∞c (0,Θ). Then we have
−
∫ Θ
0
α
d(θ1ϕ)
dθ1
ψ
vm
2
α,1dθ1 =
∫ Θ
0
αθ1
dψ
vm
2
α,1
dθ1
ϕdθ1
=
∫ Θ
0
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vm2 (i)ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v
m
2 (i))ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i)
]
ϕdθ1
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=
∫ Θ
0
inf
v1∈V1
{∫
U1
∫
U2
Π¯u1,u2v1(du1)v
m
2 (i)(du2)ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i)
+ θ1
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯1(i, u1, u2))v1(du1)v
m
2 (i)(du2)ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i)
}
ϕdθ1.
Letting m → ∞ along a suitable subsequence and using (A1), we get for
each i ∈ S,
−
∫ Θ
0
α
d(θ1ϕ)
dθ1
ψα,1(θ1, i)dθ1
=
∫ Θ
0
inf
v1∈V1
{∫
U1
∫
U2
Π¯u1,u2v1(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)ψα,1(θ1, i)
+ θ1
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯1(i, u1, u2))v1(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)ψα,1(θ1, i)
}
ϕdθ1
=
∫ Θ
0
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vˆ2(i)ψα,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ2(i))ψα,1(θ1, i)
]}
ϕ(θ)dθ1.
Therefore we have
αθ1
dψα,1
dθ1
= inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vˆ2(i)ψα,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ2(i))ψα,1(θ1, i)
]
,
in the sense of distribution. Note that right hand side above is continuous.
Therefore
dψα,1
dθ
∈ C((0,Θ)×S). Thus ψα,1 ∈ Cb([0,Θ]×S)∩C
1((0,Θ)×S)
is a solution to


αθ1
dψα,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vˆ2(i)ψα,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ2(i))ψα,1(θ1, i)
]
ψα,1(0, i) = 1.
Therefore, using Itoˆ’s formula, ψα,1 admits the following representation
ψα,1(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈M1
Ev1,vˆ2i
[
eθ1
∫∞
0
e−αt r1(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),vˆ2(Y (t−)))dt
]
.
Hence ψα,1 = ψ
vˆ2
α,1. The continuity of v2 → ψ
v2
α,1 follows. Similarly we can
show that v1 → ψ
v1
α,1 is continuous. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.1. Assume (A1). Then there exist (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1×S2 and a pair
of functions which are bounded and continuously differentiable (ψ
v∗
2
α,1, ψ
v∗
1
α,2)
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satisfying the following coupled HJB equations
(3.5)

αθ1
dψ
v∗
2
α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2(i)ψ
v∗
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v
∗
2(i))ψ
v∗
2
α,1(θ1, i)
]
= Πv∗
1
,v∗
2
(i)ψ
v∗
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v
∗
1 , v
∗
2(i))ψ
v∗
2
α,1(θ1, i)
ψ
v∗
2
α,1(0, i) = 1,
αθ2
dψ
v∗
1
α,2
dθ2
(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1
(i),v2ψ
v∗
1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v2)ψ
v∗
1
α,2(θ2, i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v∗
2
ψ
v∗
1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v
∗
2)ψ
v∗
1
α,2(θ2, i)
ψ
v∗
1
α,2(0, i) = 1.
Proof. Let v2 ∈ S2. For i ∈ S, v1 ∈ V1, set
F1(i, v1, v2(i)) = Πv1,v2(i)ψ
v2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v2(i))ψ
v2
α,1(θ1, i),
where ψv2α,1 is the solution of the equation (3.3). Let
H(v2) =
{
v∗1 ∈ S1
∣∣∣F1(i, v∗1(i), v2(i)) = inf
v1∈V1
F1(i, v1, v2(i)) for all i ∈ S
}
.
Obviously v∗1 depends on θ1 and α. We suppress this dependence for no-
tational simplicity. Then by a standard measurable selection theorem (see
Benesˇ [3]), H(v2) is a non empty subset of S1. Clearly H(v2) is convex. It
is easy to show that H(v2) is closed and hence compact.
Similarly for i ∈ S, v1 ∈ S1 and v2 ∈ V2, set
F2(i, v1(i), v2) = Πv1(i),v2ψ
v1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, v1(i), v2)ψ
v1
α,2(θ2, i),
where ψv1α,2 is the solution of the equation (3.4). Let
H(v1) =
{
v∗2 ∈ S2
∣∣∣F2(i, v1(i), v∗2(i)) = inf
v2∈V2
F2(i, v1(i), v2) for all i ∈ S
}
.
Then, as before, H(v1) is convex and compact.
Define
H(v1, v2) = H(v2)×H(v1).
Then H(v1, v2) is nonempty, convex, and compact subset of S1 ×S2 . Thus
(v1, v2)→ H(v1, v2)
defines a point to set map from S1×S2 to 2
S1×S2 . Next we want to show that
this map is upper semicontinuous. Let {(vm1 , v
m
2 )} ∈ S1×S2 and (v
m
1 , v
m
2 )→
(vˆ1, vˆ2) in S1×S2, i.e., for each i ∈ S, (v
m
1 (i), v
m
2 (i))→ (vˆ1(i), vˆ2(i)) in V1×
V2. Let v¯
m
1 ∈ H(v
m
2 ). Then {v¯
m
1 } ⊂ S1. Since S1 is compact, it has a
convergent subsequence, denoted by the same sequence with an abuse of
notation, such that
v¯m1 → v¯1 in S1.
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Then (v¯m1 , v
m
2 )→ (v¯1, vˆ2) in S1 × S2 . Now using Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, we
obtain
F1(i, v¯1(i), vˆ2(i)) =
∫
U1
∫
U2
Π¯u1,u2 v¯1(i)(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)ψ
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i)
+ θ1
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯1(i, u1, u2)v¯1(i)(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)ψ
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i)
=
∑
j∈S
∫
U1
∫
U2
π¯ij(u1, u2)ψ
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, j)v¯1(i)(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)
+ θ1
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯1(i, u1, u2)v¯1(i)(du1)vˆ2(i)(du2)ψ
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i)
= lim
m→∞
∑
j∈S
∫
U1
∫
U2
π¯ij(u1, u2)ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, j)v¯
m
1 (i)(du1)v
m
2 (i)(du2)
+ θ1 lim
m→∞
∫
U1
∫
U2
r¯1(i, u1, u2)v¯
m
1 (du1)v
m
2 (i)(du2)ψ
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i)
= lim
m→∞
F1(i, v¯
m
1 (i), v
m
2 (i)).(3.6)
Now fix v˜1 ∈ S1 and consider the sequence (v˜1, v
m
2 ). Repeat the above
argument to conclude that
F1(i, v˜1(i), vˆ2(i)) = lim
m→∞
F1(i, v˜1(i), v
m
2 (i)).(3.7)
Using the fact v¯m1 ∈ H(v
m
2 ), we have
F1(i, v˜1(i), v
m
2 (i)) ≥ F1(i, v¯
m
1 (i), v
m
2 (i)) for all m.
Thus
F1(i, v˜1(i), vˆ2(i)) ≥ F1(i, v¯1(i), vˆ2(i)) for all v˜1 ∈ S1.
Therefore v¯1 ∈ H(vˆ2). Let v¯
m
2 ∈ H(v
m
1 ) and along a subsequence
v¯m2 → v¯2 in S2.
Using analogous arguments, we obtain v¯2 ∈ H(vˆ1). The upper semicontinu-
ity of the map
(v1, v2)→ H(v1, v2)
follows. By Fan’s fixed point theorem [10], there exists (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1×S2 such
that (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ H(v
∗
1 , v
∗
2). This establishes that there exist (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1×S2
and (ψ
v∗
2
α,1, ψ
v∗
1
α,2) satisfy the coupled HJB equations (3.5). 
Remark 3.1. (i) Note that v∗1 and v
∗
2 depend on θ1 and θ2 respectively.
Hence ψ
v∗
2
α,1 (resp. ψ
v∗
1
α,2) depend both on θ1 and θ2. Thus for each θ2, ψ
v∗
2
α,1 is
continuously differentiable with respect to θ1 and for each θ1, ψ
v∗
1
α,2 is contin-
uously differentiable with respect to θ2. We have suppressed this dependence
on θ2 (resp. on θ1) for notational convenience.
(ii) Note that for the discounted cost criterion the corresponding coupled
HJB equations are given by (3.5). However, the pair of stationary strategies
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(v∗1 , v
∗
2) does not constitute a Nash equilibrium for this criterion. If player
1 announces his strategy v∗1 then the optimal response for player 2 for the
discounted criterion is given by the the Markov strategy v∗2(θ2e
−αt, i). An
analogous statement holds for optimal response of player 1. Thus the exis-
tence of a pair of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies for the discounted
cost criterion needs further analysis which we carry out in the next subsec-
tion.
3.2. Existence of Nash Equilibrium for Discounted Cost Criterion.
In this subsection we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium under
the following additive structure on π¯u1,u2 and r¯k(i, u1, u2).
(A2)We assume that π¯ij : U1×U2 → R and r¯k : S×U1×U2 → [0, ∞), k =
1, 2 are given by
π¯ij(u1, u2) = π¯
1
ij(u1) + π¯
2
ij(u2),
r¯k(i, u1, u2) = r¯k1(i, u1) + r¯k2(i, u2), i ∈ S, u1 ∈ U1, u2 ∈ U2, k = 1, 2,
where π¯kij : Uk → R assumed to be continuous;
sup
i,j∈S,u∈U
|π¯kij(u)| :=M <∞ .
r¯kl : S × Ul → [0, ∞), k, l = 1, 2, assumed to be bounded and continuous.
These type of additive structure are rather standard in non-zero sum
stochastic differential games (see, e.g., Borkar and Ghosh [4]) and non-zero
sum stochastic games on an uncountable state space by Himmelberg et al.
[21]. In fact in stochastic games these conditions are referred to as ARAT
(additive reward, additive transition).
Now we define a class of strategies to be referred to as eventually station-
ary strategies denoted by Sˆk, k = 1, 2. Let
Sˆk = {vˆk : (0,Θ)×S → Vk |vˆk(·, i) is measurable for each i ∈ S}, k = 1, 2.
Note that as opposed to Sk, the topology of pointwise convergence on Sˆk is
not metrizable. Thus we endow the space Sˆk with the weak* topology on
L∞((0,Θ)×S,Ms(Uk)), k = 1, 2, introduced by Warga [29] for the topology
of relaxed controls, where Ms(Uk) is the space of all finite signed measure
on Uk endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Note that with
the above topology, Sˆk becomes a compact metrizable space with following
convergence criterion:
For k = 1, 2, vˆnk → vˆk in Sˆk as n→∞ if and only if for each i ∈ S
(3.8)
lim
n→∞
∫ Θ
0
f(θ)
∫
Uk
g(θ, uk)vˆ
n
k (θ, i)(duk)dθ =
∫ Θ
0
f(θ)
∫
Uk
g(θ, uk)vˆk(θ, i)(duk)dθ,
for all f ∈ L1(0,Θ)∩L2(0,Θ) = L2(0,Θ), g ∈ Cb((0,Θ)×Uk). The Markov
strategies associated with vˆk ∈ Sˆk, k = 1, 2 is given by vˆk(θe
−αt, Y (t−)), t ≥
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0 for each θ ∈ (0,Θ) and α > 0, where Y (t) is the solution of the equation
(3.9) dY (t) =
∫
R
h(Y (t−), vˆ1(θe
−αt, Y (t−)), vˆ2(θe
−αt, Y (t−)), z)℘(dzdt).
By an abuse of notation, we represent the eventually stationary Markov
strategies by elements of Sˆk though each member in Sˆk corresponds to a fam-
ily of Markov strategies indexed by θ and α. Note that as t→∞, e−αt → 0.
Thus in the long run an element of Sˆk “eventually” becomes an element of
Sk. Hence the terminology.
Define for vˆk ∈ Sˆk, k = 1, 2
ψ˜vˆ2α,1(θ1, i) = inf
v˜1∈M1
J v˜1,vˆ2α,1 (θ1, i), θ1,∈ (0, Θ), i ∈ S
ψ˜vˆ1α,2(θ2, i) = inf
v˜2∈M2
J vˆ1,v˜2α,2 (θ2, i), θ2,∈ (0, Θ), i ∈ S.(3.10)
By using similar arguments as in previous subsection it follows that ψ˜vˆ2α,1 is
a bounded and absolutely continuous function satisfying the the following
equation
(3.11)

αθ1
dψ˜vˆ2α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vˆ2(θ1,i)ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ2(θ1, i))ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i)
]
ψ˜vˆ2α,1(0, i) = 1,
and ψ˜vˆ1α,2 is a bounded and absolutely continuous function satisfying the the
following equation
(3.12)

αθ2
dψ˜vˆ1α,2
dθ2
(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πvˆ1(θ2,i),v2ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, vˆ1(θ2, i), v2)ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2(θ2, i)
]
.
ψ˜vˆ1α,2(0, i) = 1.
As before we can establish the following result, we omit the details.
Lemma 3.3. Assume (A1). Then for θ ∈ (0,Θ) and α > 0 and vˆk ∈
Sˆk, k = 1, 2, we have
1 ≤ max{ψ˜vˆ2α,1(θ, i), ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2(θ, i)} ≤ max
k=1,2
{e
θ‖rk‖∞
α },(3.13)
max{‖
dψ˜vˆ2α,1
dθ
‖∞, ‖
dψ˜vˆ1α,2
dθ
‖∞} ≤ max
k=1,2
{
‖rk‖∞
α
e
Θ‖rk‖∞
α }.
Lemma 3.4. Assume (A1). Then the maps vˆ1 7→ ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2 from Sˆ1 → C
1([0,Θ]×
S) and vˆ2 7→ ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1 from Sˆ2 → C
1([0,Θ]× S) are continuous.
Let vˆ2 ∈ Sˆ2. For i ∈ S, v1 ∈ V1 and θ1 ∈ (0,Θ), set
F˜1(i, v1, vˆ2(θ1, i)) = Πv1,vˆ2(θ1,i)ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ2(θ1, i)))ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i).
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Let
H˜(vˆ2) =
{
vˆ∗1 ∈ Sˆ1
∣∣∣F˜1(i, vˆ∗1(θ1, i), vˆ2(θ1, i)) = inf
v1∈V1
F˜1(i, v1, vˆ2(θ1, i)) for all i ∈ S
}
.
Similarly for i ∈ S, vˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1, v2 ∈ V2 θ2 ∈ (0,Θ), set
F˜2(i, vˆ1(θ2, i), v2) = Πvˆ1(θ2,i),v2ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, vˆ1(θ2, i), v2)ψ˜
vˆ1
α,2(θ2, i),
and
H˜(vˆ1) =
{
vˆ∗2 ∈ Sˆ2
∣∣∣F˜2(i, vˆ1(θ2, i), vˆ∗2(θ2, i)) = inf
v2∈V2
F˜2(i, vˆ1(θ2, i), v2) for all i ∈ S
}
.
Define
H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2) = H˜(vˆ2)× H˜(vˆ1).
Then using arguments as in Theorem 3.1, it follows that H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2) is nonempty,
convex, and compact subset of Sˆ1 × Sˆ2. Therefore (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2) de-
fines a map from Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 → 2
Sˆ1 × 2Sˆ2 . Now we establish the following
result.
Lemma 3.5. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then the map (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2)
is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let {(vm1 , v
m
2 )} ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 and (v
m
1 , v
m
2 ) → (vˆ1, vˆ2) in Sˆ1 × Sˆ2. Let
v¯m1 ∈ H˜(v
m
2 ). Then v¯
m
1 ⊂ Sˆ1. Since Sˆ1 is compact, it has a convergent
subsequence, denoted by the same sequence with an abuse of notation, such
that
v¯m1 → v¯1 in Sˆ1.
Then (v¯m1 , v
m
2 ) → (v¯1, vˆ2) in Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 . Now using (A2), Lemmata 3.3 and
3.4, and the topology of Sˆk, k = 1, 2 it follows that for each i ∈ S
Πv¯m
1
,vm
2
(θ1,i)ψ˜
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v¯
m
1 , v
m
2 (θ1, i)))ψ˜
vm
2
α,1(θ1, i)
converges weakly in L2(0,Θ) to
Πv¯1,vˆ2(θ1,i)ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v¯1, vˆ2(θ1, i)))ψ˜
vˆ2
α,1(θ1, i).
Thus, by Banach-Saks theorem any sequence of convex combination of the
former converges strongly in L2(0,Θ) to the latter. Hence along a suitable
subsequence
lim
m→∞
F˜1(i, v¯
m
1 (θ1, i), v
m
2 (θ1, i)) = F˜1(i, v¯1(θ1, i), vˆ2(θ1, i)), a.e. in θ1.
Now fix v˜1 ∈ Sˆ1 and consider the sequence (v˜1, v
m
2 ). Repeat the above
argument to conclude that
F˜1(i, v˜1(θ1, i), vˆ2(θ1, i)) = lim
m→∞
F˜1(i, v˜1(θ1, i), v
m
2 (θ1, i)), a.e. in θ1.
Using the fact v¯m1 ∈ H(v
m
2 ), for any m we have
F˜1(i, v˜1(θ1, i), v
m
2 (θ1, i)) ≥ F˜1(i, v¯
m
1 (θ1, i), v
m
2 (θ1, i)), a.e. in θ1.
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Thus for any v˜1 ∈ Sˆ1
F˜1(i, v˜1(θ1, i), vˆ2(θ1, i)) ≥ F˜1(i, v¯1(θ1, i), vˆ2(θ1, i)), a.e. in θ1.
Therefore v¯1 ∈ H˜(vˆ2). Let v¯
m
2 ∈ H˜(v
m
1 ) and along a subsequence
v¯m2 → v¯2 in Sˆ2.
Using analogous arguments, we obtain v¯2 ∈ H˜(vˆ1). This prove that the map
(vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2)
is upper semicontinuous. 
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1) and (A2). There exists α-discounted Nash
equilibrium in the class Sˆ1 × Sˆ2.
Proof. From Lemma 3.5 and Fan’s fixed point theorem [10], there exists
a fixed point (vˆ∗1 , vˆ
∗
2) ∈ Sˆ1 × Sˆ2, for the map (vˆ1, vˆ2) 7→ H˜(vˆ1, vˆ2) from
Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 → 2
Sˆ1 × 2Sˆ2 , i.e.,
(vˆ∗1 , vˆ
∗
2) ∈ H˜(vˆ
∗
1 , vˆ
∗
2).
This implies that (ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1, ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2) satisfies the following coupled HJB equations
(3.14)

αθ1
dψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vˆ∗2(θ1,i)ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, v1, vˆ
∗
2(θ1, i))ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(θ1, i)
]
= Πvˆ∗
1
(θ1,i),vˆ∗2(θ1,i)
ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(θ1, i) + θ1r1(i, vˆ
∗
1(θ1, i), vˆ
∗
2(θ1, i))ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(θ1, i)
ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(0, i) = 1,
αθ2
dψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2
dθ2
(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πvˆ∗
1
(θ2,i),v2ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, vˆ
∗
1(θ2, i), v2)ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(θ2, i)
]
= Πvˆ∗
1
(θ2,i),vˆ∗2(θ2,i)
ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(θ2, i) + θ2r2(i, vˆ
∗
1(θ2, i), vˆ
∗
2(θ2, i))ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(θ2, i)
ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(0, i) = 1.
Now from (3.10), we have
ψ˜
vˆ∗
2
α,1(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈M1
J
v1,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i)
= J
vˆ∗
1
,vˆ∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i),
ψ˜
vˆ∗
1
α,2(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈M2
J
vˆ∗
1
,v2
α,2 (θ2, i)
= J
vˆ∗
1
,vˆ∗
2
α,2 (θ2, i).
Therefore we obtain
J
v1,vˆ
∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i) ≥ J
vˆ∗
1
,vˆ∗
2
α,1 (θ1, i), ∀ v1 ∈ M1,
J
vˆ∗
1
,v2
α,2 (θ2, i) ≥ J
vˆ∗
1
,vˆ∗
2
α,2 (θ2, i), ∀ v2 ∈ M2.
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This proves the existence of α-discounted Nash equilibrium which is even-
tually stationary Markov strategies. 
4. Vanishing Discount Asymptotics
In this section we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies for
the ergodic cost criterion in the class of stationary Markov strategies under
the following assumption:
(A3)(Lyapunov condition) There exist constants b > 0, δ > 0, a finite set
C and a map W : S → [1,∞) with W (i)→∞ as i→∞, such that
ΠvW (i) ≤ −2δW (i) + bIC(i), i ∈ S, v ∈ V .
We refer to Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma [15] for examples of controlled con-
tinuous time Markov chains satisfying the above condition.
Throughout this section, we assume that for every pair of stationary
Markov strategies (v1, v2) the corresponding Markov chain is irreducible.
First we truncate our cost functions: This process plays a crucial role in find-
ing a Nash equilibrium of the game. For k = 1, 2, let rnk : S × V → [0, ∞)
be given by
(4.1) rnk :=
{
rk if i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}
0 otherwise.
Then as in the previous section we can show the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1). Then there exist a pair of Markov station-
ary strategy (v∗1,n, v
∗
2,n) and a pair of bounded, continuously differentiable
functions (ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n, ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n) such that
(4.2)

αθ1
dψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
(θ1, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2,n(i)ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) + θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
∗
2,n(i))ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
]
= Πv∗
1,n,v
∗
2,n(i)
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) + θ1r
n
1 (i, v
∗
1,n, v
∗
2,n(i))ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i),
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1 (0, i) = 1,
αθ2
dψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n
dθ2
(θ2, i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1,n(i),v2
ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) + θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v2)ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i)
]
= Πv∗
1,n(i),v
∗
2,n
ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) + θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v
∗
1,n)ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i),
ψ
v∗
1,n
α,2 (0, i) = 1.
Let
(4.3) φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) :=
1
θ1
lnψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i).
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Then
αθ1
dψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
= θ1

αφv∗2,nα,1n + θ1αdφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1

ψv∗2,nα,1n.
Let θ1

αφv∗2,nα,1n + θ1αdφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1

 = gv∗2,nα,1n(θ1, i). Then ψv
∗
2,n
α,1n is a solution to the
ODE

0 = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2,n(i)ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n + (θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
∗
2,n(i)) − g
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i))ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
]
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(0, i) = 1.
In what follows we fix a reference state i0 ∈ S satisfying
W (i0) ≥ 1 +
b
δ
.
Set
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) =
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0)
.
Then a straightforward calculation shows that ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n is a solution to the
ODE

0 = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2,n(i)ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n + (θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
∗
2,n(i)) − g
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i))ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n
]
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0) = 1.
Using analogous arguments we can show that ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n is a solution to the ODE


0 = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1,n(i),v2
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n + (θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v2)− g
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i))ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n
]
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i0) = 1,
where θ2

αφv∗1,nα,2n + θ2αdφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n
dθ2

 = gv∗1,nα,2n(θ2, i).
This immediately yields the following result:
Theorem 4.2. Assume (A1). Then there exist a pair of Markov station-
ary strategy (v∗1,n, v
∗
2,n) and a pair of bounded, continuously differentiable
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functions (ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n, ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n) such that
(4.4)

0 = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2,n(i)ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n + (θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
∗
2,n(i)) − g
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i))ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n
]
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0) = 1,
0 = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1,n(i),v2
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n + (θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v2)− g
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i))ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n
]
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i0) = 1.
Next we want to take limit α→ 0. To this end we show that ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i), ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i)
and g
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i), g
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) are uniformly bounded in α for each i ∈ S.
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1). Let φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n, φ
v∗
1,n
α,2n be given by (4.3), then the
following inequalities hold:
‖αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n‖∞ +
∥∥∥αθ1dφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 3‖r1‖∞, ∀ 0 < α < 1, 0 < θ < Θ.
and
‖αφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n‖∞ +
∥∥∥αθ2dφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n
dθ2
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 3‖r2‖∞, ∀ 0 < α < 1, 0 < θ < Θ.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, we have
1 ≤ ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≤ e
θ1‖r1‖∞
α , ∀ 0 < θ1 < Θ, i ∈ S, 0 < α < 1.
Therefore
‖αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n‖∞ ≤ ‖r1‖∞, ∀ 0 < θ1 < Θ, i ∈ S, 0 < α < 1.
For (v1, v
∗
2,n) ∈M1 × S2, i ∈ S, set
F 1nα (i, v1, v
∗
2,n) =
∫ ∞
0
e−αt rn1 (Y (t−), v1(t, Y (t−)), v
∗
2,n(Y (t−)))dt
and
H1nα (θ1, i, v1, v
∗
2,n) = logE
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫∞
0
e−αt rn
1
(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v∗2,n(Y (t−)))dt
]
.
Then we have
dH1nα
dθ1
=
1
E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i [e
θ1F 1nα ]
E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i [F
1n
α e
θ1F
1n
α ] ≤
‖r1‖∞
α
.
Using analogous arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we can show that
for each ǫ > 0,
|(θ1 + ǫ)φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1 + ǫ, i)− θ1φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)| ≤ sup
v1∈M1
|H1nα (θ1 + ǫ, i, v1, v
∗
2,n)−H
1n
α (θ1, i, v1, v
∗
2,n)|
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≤ ǫ
‖r1‖∞
α
.
Analogous bound can be obtained for ǫ < 0. Therefore we have
∥∥∥αd(θ1φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n)
dθ1
∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖r1‖∞.
Note that
∥∥∥αθ1dφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥αd(θ1φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n)
dθ1
∥∥∥
∞
+ ‖αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n‖∞.
Hence
‖αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n‖∞ +
∥∥∥αθ1 dφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 3‖r1‖∞, ∀ 0 < α < 1, 0 < θ < Θ.
Using analogous arguments we can show that
‖αφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n‖∞ +
∥∥∥αθ2 dφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n
dθ2
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 3‖r2‖∞, ∀ 0 < α < 1, 0 < θ < Θ.
This completes the proof. 
Form the Lemma 4.1, it is clear that g
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i), g
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) are uniformly
bounded. For each i ∈ S, we want to show that ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i), ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) are
uniformly (in α) bounded.
We need the following result which is proved by Kumar and Pal [[26], The-
orem 3.1].
Theorem 4.3. Assume (A1). For any set S˜ ⊆ S,
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≤ inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τ
0
e−αsrn
1
(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , Y (τ))
]
,
where τ is the hitting time of the process Y (t) corresponding to (v1, v
∗
2,n) ∈
M1 ×M2 to the set S˜.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1) and (A3). Let Y (t) be the process (2.1) corre-
sponding to (v1, v2) ∈M1×M2 and let C0 = {j ∈ S :W (j) ≥ 1+
b
δ
}. Then
for each j ∈ C0
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτj
]
≤ W (i),
where τj = inf{t ≥ 0 : Y (t) = j}.
Proof. Applying Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula to f(t) = eδtW (Y (t)), and using (A3),
we obtain
Ev1,v2i [f(τj ∧ τN )−W (i)]
= Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ τj∧τN
0
eδs[Πv1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−))W (Y (s)) + δW (Y (s))]ds
]
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≤ Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ τj∧τN
0
eδs(−δW (Y (s)) + bIC(Y (s)))ds
]
≤ (
b
δ
− 1)Ev1 ,v2i
[
eδ(τj∧τN )
]
≤
b
δ
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτj
]
,
where τN = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) /∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}}. Hence
Ev1,v2i [e
δ(τj∧τN )W (Y (τj ∧ τN ))] ≤ W (i) +
b
δ
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτj
]
.
By letting N →∞ and invoking Fatou’s lemma, we obtain
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτjW (Y (τj))
]
≤ W (i) +
b
δ
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτj
]
.
Therefore,
Ev1,v2i [e
δτj (W (j)−
b
δ
)] ≤ W (i) .
Since W (j) ≥ 1 + b
δ
, we get
Ev1,v2i
[
eδτj
]
≤ W (i).
This completes the proof. 
Before proceeding further we make the following small cost assumption.
(A4) θ1‖r1‖∞ ≤ δ and θ2‖r2‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is as in (A3).
Lemma 4.3. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Let Y (t) be the process (2.1)
corresponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2. Then for k = 1, 2, we have
Ev1,v2i [e
θk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dsW (Y (T ))]
≤ (W (i) + bT )Ev1,v2i
[
eθk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))ds
]
, T ∈ [0,∞).
Proof. Applying Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula to
g(t) = eθk
∫ t
0
rk(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsW (Y (t)),
and using (A3) and (A4), we obtain
Ev1,v2i [g(T ∧ τN )−W (i)]
= Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ T∧τN
0
eθk
∫ s
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
[
Πv1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−))W (Y (s))
+ θkrk(Y (s−), v1(s, Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−)))W (Y (s))
]
ds
]
≤ Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ T∧τN
0
eθk
∫ s
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
[
Πv1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−))W (Y (s)) + δW (Y (s))
]
ds
]
≤ Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ T∧τN
0
eθk
∫ s
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt(−δW (Y (s)) + bIC(Y (s)))ds
]
≤ bTEv1,v2i
[
eθk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
,
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where τN = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) /∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}}. Hence
Ev1,v2i [e
θk
∫ T∧τN
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dtW (Y (T ∧ τN ))]
≤ W (i) + bTEv1,v2i
[
eθk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
.
By letting N →∞ and invoking Fatou’s lemma, we obtain
Ev1,v2i [e
θk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dtW (Y (T ))]
≤ (W (i) + bT )Ev1,v2i
[
eθk
∫ T
0
rk(Y (t−),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4.4. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≤ W (i), i ∈ S
and
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) ≤ W (i), i ∈ S.
Proof. From Theorem 4.3, we have for vˆ1 ∈M1,
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τi0
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , Y (τi0))
]
= E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τi0
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , i0))
]
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τi0
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0)
]
where τi0 = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) = i0}. In the last inequality we used the fact
that ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(·, i) is nondecreasing in θ1 for each fixed i. Hence
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τi0
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))ds
]
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i e
θ1‖r1‖∞τi0 ≤ W (i) .
The last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2. Using analogous arguments we
can show that
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) ≤ W (i), i ∈ S.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4.5. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then
sup
α>0,i∈S
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) <∞
and
sup
α>0,i∈S
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) <∞.
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Proof. Let i ≥ n+1 and let Y (t) be the solution corresponding to (v1, v
∗
2,n) ∈
M1 × S2 with initial condition i. Then from Theorem 4.3, we have
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
≤ E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ τ
0
e−αsrn
1
(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , Y (τ))
]
≤ E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , Y (τ))
]
≤ E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, Y (τ))
]
where
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Y (t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}.
In the last inequality we used the fact that ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(·, i) is nondecreasing in
θ1 for each fixed i. Hence
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≤ 1 + max
j=1,...,n
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, j) ≤ 1 + max
j=1,...,n
W (j) .
since ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0) ≥ 1 and last inequality follows from Lemma 4.4. Therefore
for each n ≥ 1, ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n is bounded. Similarly we can prove that for each
n ≥ 1, ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n is bounded. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 4.6. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≥
1
W (i0)
, i ∈ C0
and
ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i) ≥
1
W (i0)
, i ∈ C0,
where C0 is as in Lemma 4.2.
Proof. From Theorem 4.3, we have for vˆ1 ∈M1,
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0)
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i0
[
eθ1
∫ τi
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , Y (τi))
]
= E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i0
[
eθ1
∫ τi
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1e
−ατ , i))
]
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i0
[
eθ1
∫ τi
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))dsψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
]
where τi = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) = i}. In the last inequality we used the fact that
ψ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(·, i) is nondecreasing in θ1 . Hence for i ∈ C0
1
ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i0
[
eθ1
∫ τi
0
e−αsr1(Y (s−),vˆ1((s,Y (s−))),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))ds
]
≤ E
vˆ1,v
∗
2,n
i0
eθ1‖r1‖∞τi ≤ W (i0) .
The last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2. Using analogous arguments we
obtain the other bound. This completes the proof. 
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Theorem 4.4. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then there exist a pair of
stationary Markov strategies (v∗1,n, v
∗
2,n), a pair of scalars (ρ
∗
1n, ρ
∗
2n) and a
pair of functions (ψˆ∗1n(i)), ψˆ
∗
2n(i)) in BW (S)×BW (S) such that
(4.5)


θ1ρ
∗
1n ψˆ
∗
1n(i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2,n(i)ψˆ
∗
1n(i) + θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
∗
2,n(i))ψˆ
∗
1n(i)
]
= Πv∗
1,n(i),v
∗
2,n(i)
ψˆ∗1n(i) + θ1r
n
1 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v
∗
2,n(i))ψˆ
∗
1n(i)
ψˆ∗1n(i0) = 1,
θ2ρ
∗
2n ψˆ
∗
2n(i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1,n(i),v2
ψˆ∗2n(i) + θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v2)ψˆ
∗
2n(i)
]
= Πv∗
1,n(i),v
∗
2,n(i)
ψˆ∗2n(i) + θ2r
n
2 (i, v
∗
1,n(i), v
∗
2,n(i))ψˆ
∗
2n(i)
ψˆ∗2n(i0) = 1.
Moreover, sup
n
{ρ∗1n, ρ
∗
2n} ≤ δ.
Proof. Using Lemma 4.4, for each fix i, {ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)|α > 0} and {ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i)|α >
0} are bounded. Hence along a subsequence, denoted by the same notation
with an abuse of notation, we have ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)→ ψˆ
∗
1n(i) and ψ¯
v∗
1,n
α,2n(θ2, i)→
ψˆ∗2n(i) for each i ∈ S for some ψˆ
∗
kn : S → [0,∞), k = 1, 2 as α → 0. By
Lemma 4.4, ψˆ∗kn ∈ BW (S) for k = 1, 2. By Lemma 4.1 it follows that along
a further subsequence
(4.6) αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)→ ̺
∗
1n(θ1, i),
for each θ1 > 0 and i ∈ S. From Lemmata 4.4 and 4.6, we have
W (i) ≥ ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) ≥
1
W (i0)
∧ min
i∈Cc
0
{ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i)}, i ∈ S.
Thus
lim
α↓0
αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) = lim
α↓0
α(
1
θ1
ln ψ¯
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i) + φ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0)),
= lim
α↓0
αφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n(θ1, i0).
Hence ̺∗1n is a function of θ1 alone. Also by Lemma 4.1,

α
dφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
(θ1, i)
∣∣∣α > 0


is bounded for each i. Hence along a further subsequence
(4.7) α
dφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
(θ1, i)→ ̺
∗
2n(θ1, i).
It follows from (4.6) and (4.7) that ̺∗2n(·, ·) = (̺
∗
1n)
′
in the sense of distri-
bution, where (̺∗1n)
′
is the distributional derivative (in θ1) of ̺
∗
1n. Hence
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̺∗2n(·, ·) is also a function of θ1 alone. Thus we have: for each θ1 > 0, there
exists a constant ρ∗1n such that along a suitable subsequence
θ1

αφv∗2,nα,1n(θ1, i) + θ1αdφ
v∗
2,n
α,1n
dθ1
(θ1, i)

→ ρ∗1n, i ∈ S.
Using analogous arguments, we have along a suitable subsequence
θ2

αφv∗1,nα,2n(θ2, i) + θ2αdφ
v∗
1,n
α,2n
dθ2
(θ2, i)

→ ρ∗2n, i ∈ S,
where ρ∗2n is a constant.
Let all sequences above converge along a common subsequence αm . From
Theorem 4.2, there exists a pair of Markov stationary strategies (vαm1,n , v
αm
2,n )
and a pair of bounded, absolutely continuous functions (ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
, ψ¯
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
) such
that
(4.8)

0 = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,vαm2,n (i)ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
+ (θ1r
n
1 (i, v1, v
αm
2,n (i))− g
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
(θ1, i))ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
]
=
[
Πvαm
1,n ,v
αm
2,n (i)
ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
+ (θ1r
n
1 (i, v
αm
1,n , v
αm
2,n (i)) − g
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
(θ1, i))ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
]
ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,1n
(θ1, i0) = 1,
0 = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πvαm
1,n (i),v2
ψ¯
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
+ (θ2r
n
2 (i, v
αm
1,n (i), v2)− g
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
(θ2, i))ψ¯
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
]
=
[
Πvαm
1,n (i),v
αm
2,n (i)
ψ¯
v
αm
2,n
αm,2n
+ (θ1r
n
1 (i, v
αm
1,n (i), v
αm
2,n (i)) − g
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
(θ1, i))ψ¯
v
αm
1,n
αm ,2n
]
ψ¯
v
αm
1,n
αm,2n
(θ1, i0) = 1.
Since S1 and S2 are compact, therefore along a subsequence denoted by the
same subsequence αm, we have v
αm
1,n → v
∗
1,n and v
αm
2,n → v
∗
2,n as αm → 0, for
some (v∗1,n, v
∗
2,n) ∈ S1×S2. The first part of the proof now follows by letting
αm → 0 in (4.8).
Let Y (t) be the process corresponding to (v1, v
∗
2,n) with initial condition
i ∈ S. Then using Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula and (4.5), we get
E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
(rn
1
(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))−ρ
∗
1n)dsψˆ∗1n(Y (T ))
]
− ψˆ∗1n(i) ≥ 0.
Note that by Lemma 4.5, ψˆ∗1n is bounded, which implies
ψˆ∗1n(i) ≤ K(n)E
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
(rn
1
(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))−ρ
∗
1n)ds
]
,
where
K(n) = max
{
max
j=1,...,n
ψˆ∗1n(j), 1 + max
j=1,··· ,n
W (j)
}
.
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Taking logarithm, dividing by θ1T and by letting T →∞, we obtain
ρ∗1n ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnE
v1,v
∗
2,n
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
rn
1
(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2,n(Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Since θ1r
n
1 ≤ θ1r1 ≤ δ, it follows that 0 ≤ ρ
∗
1n ≤ δ. Similarly we can show
that 0 ≤ ρ∗2n ≤ δ. Therefore we have sup
n
{ρ∗1n, ρ
∗
2n} ≤ δ. This completes the
proof. 
Finally we prove that the coupled HJB equations described in Section
2 have suitable solutions which in turn leads to the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Theorem 4.5. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then there exist a pair of
stationary Markov strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2), a pair of scalars (ρ
∗
1, ρ
∗
2) and a pair of
functions (ψˆ∗1(i)), ψˆ
∗
2(i)) in BW (S)×BW (S) such that
(4.9)


θ1ρ
∗
1 ψˆ
∗
1(i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2(i)ψˆ
∗
1(i) + θ1r1(i, v1, v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
1(i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v∗
2
(i)ψˆ
∗
1(i) + θ1r1(i, v
∗
1(i), v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
1(i)
ψˆ∗1(i0) = 1,
θ2ρ
∗
2 ψˆ
∗
2(i) = inf
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1
(i),v2ψˆ
∗
2(i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v2)ψˆ
∗
2(i)
]
= Πv∗
1
(i),v∗
2
(i)ψˆ
∗
2(i) + θ2r2(i, v
∗
1(i), v
∗
2(i))ψˆ
∗
2(i)
ψˆ∗2(i0) = 1.
Furthermore the pair of stationary Markov strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) is a Nash equi-
librium and (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2) is the corresponding Nash values.
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, we have a pair of stationary Markov strategies
(v∗1,n, v
∗
2,n), a pair of scalars (ρ
∗
1n, ρ
∗
2n) and a pair of functions (ψˆ
∗
1n(i)), ψˆ
∗
2n(i))
in BW (S)×BW (S) satisfy the coupled HJB equations (4.5). Therefore by a
diagonalization argument, along a suitable subsequence ψˆ∗1n(i)→ ψˆ
∗
1(i) and
ψˆ∗2n(i)→ ψˆ
∗
2(i), i ∈ S for (ψˆ
∗
1 , ψˆ
∗
2) ∈ BW (S)×BW (S).
Since S1 and S2 are compact, therefore along a subsequence denoted by
the same subsequence, we have v∗1,n → v
∗
1 and v
∗
2,n → v
∗
2 as n → ∞, for
(v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1 × S2.
Note that by Theorem 4.4, sup
n
{ρ∗1n, ρ
∗
2n} ≤ δ, therefore along a subse-
quence denoted by the same subsequence, we have ρ∗1n → ρ
∗
1 and ρ
∗
2n → ρ
∗
2
as n → ∞. The first part of the proof now follows by letting n → ∞ in
(4.5).
Let Y (t) be the process corresponding to (v1, v
∗
2) with initial condition
i ∈ S. Then using (4.9) and Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula, see, Guo and Herna´ndez-
Lerma [[15], Appendix C, pp. 218-219] (Note that the condition C.3 and C.4
satisfy under condition (A3) from [[15], Lemma 6.3, pp. 90-91]), we obtain
ψˆ∗1(i) ≤ E
v1,v
∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
(r1(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (Y (s−)))−ρ
∗
1
)dsψˆ∗1(Y (T ))
]
.
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It follows from Lemma 4.4 that ψˆ∗1(i) ≤W (i), for all i ∈ S. Hence
ψˆ∗1(i) ≤ e
−θ1ρ∗1TE
v1,v
∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (Y (s−)))dsW (Y (T ))
]
.
From Lemma 4.3, we get
ψˆ∗1(i) ≤ e
−θ1ρ∗1T (W (i) + bT )E
v1,v
∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Taking logarithm on both side we obtain
ln ψˆ∗1(i) ≤ −θ1ρ
∗
1T + ln(W (i) + bT ) + lnE
v1,v
∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Now dividing by θ1T and by letting T →∞, we get
ρ∗1 ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnE
v1,v
∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (s−),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (Y (s−)))ds
]
, v1 ∈ M1 .
Let v∗1 ∈ S1 be a minimizing selector in (4.9) and let Y (t) be the continuous
time Markov chain corresponding to (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ S1×S2 with initial condition
i. Then using (4.9) and Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula, we get
E
v∗
1
,v∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
(r1(Y (s−),v∗1 (Y (s−)),v
∗
2
(Y (s−)))−ρ∗
1
)dsψˆ∗1(Y (T ))
]
− ψˆ∗1(i) = 0.
Since ψˆ is bounded below by Lemma 4.6, we have
ψˆ∗1(i) ≥ KE
v∗
1
,v∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
(r1(Y (s−),v∗1 (Y (s−)),v
∗
2
(Y (s−)))−ρ∗
1
)ds
]
,
where
K =
1
W (i0)
∧ min
i∈Cc
0
{ψˆ∗1(i)}.
Taking logarithm, dividing by θ1T and by letting T →∞, we get
ρ∗1 ≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
θ1T
lnE
v∗
1
,v∗
2
i
[
eθ1
∫ T
0
r1(Y (s−),v∗1(Y (s−)),v
∗
2
(Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Therefore
ρ∗1 = ρ
v∗
1
,v∗
2
1 ≤ ρ
v1,v
∗
2
1 ∀v1 ∈ M1.
Using analogous argument we can show that
ρ∗2 = ρ
v∗
1
,v∗
2
2 ≤ ρ
v∗
1
,v2
2 ∀v2 ∈ M2.
This completes the proof. 
Remark 4.1. Note that ρ∗i , v
∗
i , i = 1, 2, depend on θ1, θ2. As before we
have suppressed this dependence for notational convenience.
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5. Conclusion
We have established the existence of a pair of stationary strategies which
constitutes a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies for risk sensitive stochas-
tic games for continuous time Markov chain with ergodic cost. We have
achieved these under a Lyapunov type stability assumption (A3) and a small
cost condition (A4) which lead to the existence of suitable solution to the
corresponding coupled HJB equations. The Lyapunov type of stability as-
sumption is standard in literature (see, e.g., Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma
[15]). The small cost assumption mean that the risk aversion parameter θk
of player k must be small. For the discounted cost criterion we have es-
tablished the existence of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies under an
additive structure (A2). It will be interesting to investigate if (A2) can be
dropped to achieve the same result.
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